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Domain Proceedings
Although it may be surprising to some, no federal constitu-tional right to a jury trial exists for eminent domain ac-
tions, since, prior to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, these
actions were not tried to a common law jury.  Because Oregon’s
jury trial constitutional provisions largely mirror those in the
U.S. Constitution, the Oregon Constitution provides no further
protection in eminent domain proceedings than the Federal Con-
stitution.  Although a legislature may guarantee a jury trial by
statute, this Comment aims to demonstrate that no such guaran-
tee exists within Oregon’s statutes.  Thus, a judge could validly
deny a litigant’s request for a jury trial in an eminent domain
proceeding.1  While this issue has yet to be directly addressed in
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2007.  Although the au-
thor served as a law clerk for the Oregon Department of Justice during the summers
of 2005 and 2006, the viewpoints expressed in this Comment do not represent the
viewpoints of the State of Oregon and are the author’s alone.  The author extends
sincerest thanks to Professor Maury Holland, without whose insight and guidance
this Comment would not have ever made it beyond the early draft stage.  The author
extends personal thanks to Gary and Kristi Peterson for their unwavering encour-
agement and support.
1 Eminent domain proceedings often address numerous issues regarding the tak-
ing in addition to the amount of compensation that is due to the property owner.  In
Oregon, several of these issues have been clearly established as ones that must be
decided by a jury. E.g. , Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or. 57, 72, 843 P.2d 400,
408 (1992) (“[W]hether there was substantial interference [by the government] to
constitute a taking in fact becomes a jury question.”); State v. Lundberg, 312 Or.
568, 574-75, 825 P.2d 641, 645 (1992) (“The question of the highest and best use of a
particular property . . . is to be decided by a jury.”); Thornburg v. Port of Portland,
233 Or. 178, 194-95, 200, 376 P.2d 100, 108, 110 (1962) (“Ordinarily, in a case of a
continuing interference, whether it is substantial enough to constitute a taking will
be for the jury to determine. . . . We cannot say, as a matter of law, that jet or rocket
[1063]
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an Oregon appellate opinion, Oregon’s newly enacted landmark
land use statute, Measure 37,2 provides opportunities for trial
and appellate judges to consider this issue in the near future.  To
cure any statutory ambiguity and to prevent unnecessary litiga-
tion, this Comment argues that the Oregon Constitution should
be amended to guarantee the right to have a jury decide “just
compensation” for a taking of private property in an eminent do-
main proceeding.
Part I of this Comment provides background law on the power
of eminent domain and describes the constitutional limitations
imposed upon this power by federal and state takings clauses.
This Part also describes the reasoning of federal and state courts
in determining that no constitutional guarantee to a jury trial ex-
ists in eminent domain actions.  Part II addresses the problem
facing an eminent domain litigant in Oregon whose request for a
jury trial to determine the measure of compensation required for
the taking is opposed.  This Part examines Oregon’s civil proce-
dure rules and eminent domain statutes for a guarantee to a jury
determination of compensation and concludes that the rules and
statutes are ambiguous.  Further, this Part also discusses steps
that other states have taken to guarantee a right to have a jury
determine the amount of compensation.
Finally, Part III looks ahead to the potential effect of this un-
certainty on Oregon’s eminent domain jurisprudence, focusing
primarily on the differing preferences of the litigants regarding a
jury trial and how Measure 37 may set the stage to debate this
issue and resolve it.  To arrive at a recommendation for how Ore-
gon should proactively address this uncertainty, this Part will
consider several available avenues and possible objections to
those proposals.
or some other kind of noise within 500 feet, or within some other number of feet, of
private land might not in a particular case cause a taking for public use.  The ques-
tion in each case must be decided by an appropriate tribunal.  Our present constitu-
tion places this duty upon the jury.”); City of Salem v. H.S.B., 75 Or. App. 556, 560,
707 P.2d 73, 76 (1985) (“Whether [adjacent] parcels have a unity of use . . . is a
practical question to be decided by the jury. . . .”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds , 302 Or. 648, 733 P.2d 890 (1987).  How-
ever, since the analysis in this Comment has no effect on these established jury is-
sues, I will address only eminent domain proceedings where the sole issue is the
measure of compensation.
2 Measure 37, a ballot initiative passed by Oregon voters in 2004 and codified as
ORS 197.352, requires governments to pay “just compensation” for any decrease in
value to private property caused by most regulations. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(1)
(2005).
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I
BACKGROUND LAW
A. The Power of Eminent Domain
“Eminent domain” is the power inherent in a sovereign to take
or authorize the taking of any property within its jurisdiction for
public use or benefit.3  The power of eminent domain allows a
sovereign to appropriate private property without the consent of
the owner and has been characterized as the most significant
power of the sovereign, second only to the drafting of soldiers.4
The U.S. Supreme Court has described the power of eminent do-
main in this way:  “All private property is held subject to the ne-
cessities of government.  The right of eminent domain underlies
all such rights of property.  The government may take personal
or real property whenever its necessities or the exigencies of the
occasion demand.”5
The existence of this power has been rationalized on a condi-
tional title theory, whereby the sovereign, when originally con-
veying title to all property, impliedly reserved the power to
declare a title forfeit when it required the property for its own
use.6  However, the more commonly embraced explanation in
the United States is that the power of eminent domain is neces-
sary to prevent recalcitrant individuals from thwarting the gov-
ernment’s efforts to carry out public functions.7
Over a century ago, the Oregon Supreme Court confirmed
that “[e]very owner of the land holds it subject to be taken for
the public use whenever it is necessarily required for that [public]
purpose.”8  In Kendall v. Post , the court held that a road supervi-
sor in Western Oregon, entrusted with the duty to maintain all
public roads in his district, was authorized to enter upon any pri-
3 Wm. Ronald Hulen, Comment, Abusive Exercises of the Power of Eminent Do-
main—Taking a Look at What the Taker Took , 44 WASH. L. REV. 200, 200 & n.1
(1968).  Only Congress and state legislatures act as the sovereign and have the inher-
ent authority to exercise eminent domain, though they may delegate the power of
eminent domain and have done so.  The executive branch and municipal govern-
ments do not have the power to exercise eminent domain, unless delegated by the
sovereign. Id.  at 200-01.
4 Id.  at 200.
5 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903), overruled in part on other
grounds by  United States v. Chicago, 313 U.S. 543 (1941).
6 Hulen, supra note 3, at 200. R
7 Id.
8 Kendall v. Post, 8 Or. 141, 144 (1879), available at  1879 WL 1242, at *3.
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vate land adjoining a road to quarry rock needed to make neces-
sary road repairs.9  The property owner requested compensation
for the rock that had been taken from his land and demanded an
injunction to prevent the road supervisor from quarrying any
more rock from his property.10  Although the property owner
demonstrated that the same kind of rock could be acquired from
nearby land, the court determined that, because the property
owner’s land was the nearest and most convenient location, the
road supervisor had not violated the owner’s property rights by
intruding upon and obtaining materials from his land.11
Although the power of eminent domain inheres in the power
of the sovereign, based upon the law of necessity, the authority
to exercise this power must be conferred by statute in Oregon.12
For example, in Oregon, the legislature has authorized the Ore-
gon State Highway Commission to exercise the power of eminent
domain for the purpose of acquiring any private property neces-
sary for highway drainage and drainage tunnels.13  Furthermore,
since the State of Oregon cannot construct all public improve-
ments on its own, it may invest a private party with the power of
eminent domain through statute.14
Once an entity has statutory authority, the procedures for tak-
ing private property pursuant to the power of eminent domain
are also prescribed by statute.15  This process is called “condem-
nation.”  When the sovereign or its delegee exercises the power
of eminent domain and takes private property for a public use
without reaching an agreement with the property owner on the
value of the property being taken, it institutes a condemnation
proceeding to determine the amount of just compensation.16
Therefore, a condemnation proceeding is a civil case in which the
9 Id. at 144, 1879 WL 1242, at *3.
10 Id. at 144, 1879 WL 1242, at *3.
11 Id.  at 144-45, 1879 WL 1242, at *4.
12 Tomasek v. Or. State Highway Comm’n, 196 Or. 120, 142, 248 P.2d 703, 713
(1952).
13 OR. REV. STAT. § 366.340(2) (2005).
14 See City of Eugene v. Johnson, 183 Or. 421, 426, 192 P.2d 251, 254 (1948) (“The
right of eminent domain, which is an attribute of sovereignty, has been vested by
legislative action in subdivisions of the state and in private corporations devoted to
uses in which the public has a right to share .”) (emphasis added).
15 See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 35.205-.625 (2005) (known as the General
Condemnation Procedure Act).
16 See, e.g. , id. § 35.245(1) (“If the condemner is unable to agree with or locate the
owner of the property . . . , then an action to condemn property may be commenced
in the circuit court of the county in which the property proposed to be condemned
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sovereign or its delegee (the “condemner”)17 files a “losing” law-
suit against the property owner (the “condemnee”).  It is referred
to as a “losing” suit since judgment is always entered in favor of
the property owner and the condemner is always required to pay
the compensation award.18
B. Takings Clauses
Since the power of eminent domain allows a sovereign to in-
fringe upon an individual’s property rights, takings clauses im-
pose constitutional limitations on this power.19  The Federal
Takings Clause provides:  “[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”20  This clause neither
authorizes nor forbids acts of eminent domain; rather, it operates
as a conditional limitation that permits the taking of private
property for a public use, but only so long as the condemner pays
just compensation.21  For this reason, any statute, whether en-
acted by Congress or a state legislature, authorizing condemna-
tion of private property for public use without providing for just
compensation would violate the Federal Takings Clause.22  Fur-
thermore, if the sovereign exercises its power of eminent domain
without bringing an action to condemn, the owner of the prop-
erty taken may go to court and sue to recover its value.23  To
deny the property owner this right would deprive him of the con-
. . . is located.”); Cereghino v. State Highway Comm’n, 230 Or. 439, 443-44, 370 P.2d
694, 696 (1962).
17 See, e.g. , § 35.215(1) (“‘Condemner’ means the state, any city, county, school
district, municipal or public corporation, political subdivision or any instrumentality
or any agency thereof or a private corporation that has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain.”).  Although the ORS utilizes a spelling of “condemner”
that varies from the more common “condemnor,” this Comment uses the ORS spell-
ing for consistency with those statutes. See, e.g. , BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 311
(8th ed. 2004) (noting “condemner” as an alternate spelling), 1 NICHOLS’ THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.141[4] (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
18 See, e.g. , Cereghino , 230 Or. at 444, 370 P.2d at 696.
19 See, e.g. , U.S. CONST. amend. V; OR. CONST. art. I, § 18.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
22 See id.
23 See, e.g. , Cereghino , 230 Or. at 444, 370 P.2d at 696.  Another example of when
a government may have failed to institute a condemnation action, and the property
owner must go to court to obtain compensation, is an “inverse condemnation.”  In-
verse condemnation occurs when governmental action falls short of acquisition of
title in, or occupancy of, the property, but its effects are so complete as to deprive
the owner of all or most of his interest in the property.  In these cases, the property
owner institutes an action against the government to obtain just compensation. See
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1945).
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stitutional protection afforded by the Takings Clause.24
For example, in United States v. Armstrong , shipbuilders who
were parties to a contract with the U.S. government alleged that
the government violated the Takings Clause when it transferred
their liens without paying compensation.25  Because these liens
were compensable property interests within the meaning of the
Takings Clause, and the transfer of the liens to the government
destroyed all of the laborers’ property rights under them, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that compensation was due under the
Takings Clause.26  Thus, the Takings Clause bars the federal gov-
ernment from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.”27
The Federal Takings Clause has been incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to apply against
the states as well as the federal government.28  Therefore, the
Federal Takings Clause applies to state condemnation actions re-
gardless of any comparable provision in a state constitution.29
Oregon’s takings clause provides that “[p]rivate property shall
not be taken for public use . . . without just compensation; nor
except in the case of the state, without such compensation first
assessed and tendered.”30  Like many other states, Oregon’s emi-
nent domain jurisprudence has largely adopted that of the U.S.
Supreme Court because the language and meaning of the Ore-
gon takings clause is nearly identical to its federal counterpart.31
24 See, e.g. , Cereghino , 230 Or. at 444-45, 370 P.2d at 696-97 (referring specifically
to the Oregon takings clause but stating that it is “identical in language and mean-
ing” to the Federal Takings Clause).
25 Armstrong , 364 U.S. at 41-42.
26 Id. at 49.  Three dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s contention that
the government had exercised its power of eminent domain, thereby subjecting it to
the Fifth Amendment. See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent were Justices Frankfurter and Clark).
27 Id. (majority opinion).
28 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
29 See id.
30 OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (providing an exception that, when the condemner is the
state, it may pay compensation after the taking).  Oregon’s takings clause has been
amended twice:  first in 1920 and subsequently in 1924.  The primary purpose of
these amendments was to further clarify the meaning of “public use.”  Since com-
pensation is the focus of this Comment, the amendments to the takings clause to
define and clarify a public use are not relevant to this Comment.
31 See supra  note 24. R
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C. Eminent Domain Actions:  An Exception to the
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
1. U.S. Constitution
Although a constitutional right to a jury trial exists in certain
civil cases, an eminent domain action is not one of those cases.32
The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“[i]n [s]uits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved.”33  In these suits, issues that a jury would have heard
at common law must be submitted to the jury to preserve this
right.34  Therefore, the Seventh Amendment merely preserves
the right to a jury as the right existed at common law prior to the
adoption of the amendment in 1791.35  To determine whether the
right to a jury trial was preserved, the court must determine
whether the action had a common law antecedent.36  Since “the
jury’s role in estimating just compensation in condemnation pro-
ceedings was inconsistent and unclear at the time the Seventh
Amendment was adopted,” the Court has consistently held that
there is no constitutional right to a jury in these proceedings.37
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
does not require a jury trial in civil cases where a jury was not
employed at the time the Constitution was adopted.38
The U.S. Supreme Court considers it long-settled that the U.S.
Constitution confers no right to a jury trial in eminent domain
32 E.g. , City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
711 (1999); see also  1A NICHOLS, supra  note 17, § 4.105[4] (“With regard to the R
claim that complainant is entitled to have his compensation assessed by a jury, it has
so often been decided that this is not a constitutional requisite that it cannot be any
longer regarded as an open question.”) (citation omitted).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
34 City of Monterey , 526 U.S. at 718.
35 See id. at 708, 718.
36 Id.  at 708.  Even if an action did not exist when the Seventh Amendment was
adopted, the Amendment’s jury guarantee extends to statutory claims unknown to
the common law so long as the claims can be said “to sound basically in tort, and
seek legal relief.” Id. at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted).  For this reason,
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have been determined to be actions at law
even though they were created by statute subsequent to the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, because they sound in tort and seek damages for a constitutional viola-
tion, which is a legal remedy. Id. at 709-10. Since eminent domain actions did exist,
but were not tried before a common law jury, the right to a jury trial was never
preserved. See id. at 718.
37 Id. at 711 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970) and Bauman
v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897)).
38 See id.
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proceedings.39  However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) provide the opportunity for a jury determination of
compensation to litigants in a federal condemnation proceed-
ing.40  Since this Comment is concerned only with the exercise of
the power of eminent domain by the State of Oregon and not the
federal government, rights conferred by the FRCP are irrelevant
to this analysis.  In fact, the rules explicitly defer to a state’s grant
of a right to a jury trial for any particular issue in a condemnation
proceeding.41
2. Oregon Constitution
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Oregon Constitution does not
guarantee the right to a jury trial in eminent domain proceed-
ings.42  Although the Oregon Constitution ensures that the right
to a jury trial “shall remain inviolate” in all civil cases43 and that
“[i]n actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
$750, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,”44 Oregon
courts have determined that neither of these provisions guaran-
tee a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings.45  Like the Sev-
enth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, these provisions
39 Reynolds , 397 U.S. at 18.
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(h) (“If the action involves the exercise of the power of
eminent domain under the law of the United States, any tribunal specially consti-
tuted by an Act of Congress governing the case for the trial of the issue of just
compensation shall be the tribunal for the determination of that issue; but if there is
no such specially constituted tribunal any party may have a trial by jury of the issue
of just compensation by filing a demand therefor . . . .”) (emphasis added).  In United
States v. Reynolds , the condemnee claimed that additional land taken for construc-
tion of recreational facilities adjacent to a reservoir was not within the original scope
of the project that required condemnation of his property.  397 U.S. at 19.  This
scope-of-the-project issue was submitted to the jury over contentions by the govern-
ment that it was an issue for the judge and not the jury. Id.  The Court concluded
that this was an issue to be ruled on by the judge because FRCP 71A(h) clearly
confines a jury’s role in federal condemnation proceedings to determining the com-
pensation award. Id.  at 20.  When a jury is afforded under FRCP 71A(h), the judge
decides all issues other than compensation, providing the judge a broader role in
condemnation proceedings than in conventional jury trials. Id.
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(k) (“The practice as herein prescribed governs in actions
involving the exercise of the power of eminent domain under the law of a state,
provided that if the state law makes provision for trial of any issue by jury, or for
trial of the issue of compensation by jury or commission or both, that provision shall
be followed.”).
42 See Moore Mill & Lumber Co. v. Foster, 216 Or. 204, 225-26, 336 P.2d 39, 49
(1959).
43 OR. CONST. art. I, § 17.
44 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
45 Moore Mill , 216 Or. at 225-26, 336 P.2d at 49.
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preserve the right to a jury trial only in civil cases where a jury
trial was customary when the Oregon Constitution was drafted in
1857.46  The provisions in the Oregon Constitution guaranteeing
a right to a jury trial entitle individuals only to a continuation of
the old methods and do not create a right to a jury in proceedings
in which a jury had never been employed at common law before
the adoption of the Oregon Constitution.47
As early as 1879, the Oregon Supreme Court in Kendall v. Post
determined that the Oregon Constitution does not guarantee a
right to a jury trial in eminent domain actions, even to determine
the measure of just compensation.48  In that case, a road supervi-
sor quarried rock from a property owner’s yard to repair a road,
trampling grass and a garden on the property in the process.49
The court determined that the constitutional right-to-jury-trial
provision requiring that “in all civil cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate” does not apply to eminent domain ac-
tions.50  Instead, the court determined that this provision applies
as a “safeguard” to actions in “courts of justice,” which eminent
domain actions are not.51  The court then quotes a prominent
treatise author:
“The determination of the question, ‘What is the value of
property taken, or what is the amount of damages sustained by
the taking?’ is undeniably judicial in its nature and peculiarly
adapted for decision of a jury under the direction of the court.
Yet it has been held that the ordinary provision as to the right
of trial by jury, in civil cases, has no relation to original assess-
ments in such cases, and that in the absence of special provi-
sion in the organic law, giving the right to have a jury assess
the damages, it is competent for the legislature to provide for
assessments by any other just mode, and to conclude the
owner, as to the amount, without giving him the right to be
heard before a jury.”52
46 Id.  at 225.
47 Id. Although the Oregon Supreme Court has determined that the right to a
jury trial should be extended to “like cases” as well, there are civil cases in which
there is no constitutional guarantee to a jury trial because they lack a common law
antecedent.  Cornelison v. Seabold, 254 Or. 401, 405, 460 P.2d 1009, 1010-11 (1969).
Examples of actions with no common law antecedent include commitment for
mental incapacity and determination of whether a relative is responsible for welfare
payments once a family member has been incapacitated. Id.  at 405, 460 P.2d at
1011.
48 Kendall v. Post, 8 Or. 141, 146 (1879), available at  1879 WL 1242, at *4.
49 Id.  at 143, 1879 WL 1242, at *3.
50 Id. at 146, 1879 WL 1242, at *4.
51 Id. at 146, 1879 WL 1242, at *4.
52 Id. at 146, 1879 WL 1242, at *4 (citation omitted).
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Relying upon this reasoning, the court determined that a law
providing for an assessment of the property owner’s damages to
be determined by a county court and not by a jury was
constitutional.53
Eighty years after Kendall , the Oregon Supreme Court contin-
ued to express the sentiment of the case, even quoting it.  The
seminal case in this area in Oregon is Moore Mill & Lumber Co.
v. Foster , which concerned two consolidated condemnation ac-
tions for easements over pieces of property for a right of way to
construct a logging road.54  The court in Moore Mill claimed that
it was satisfied that none of the right-to-jury-trial constitutional
provisions apply to eminent domain proceedings.55  Rather, the
court confirmed that these provisions merely preserve the
method of trial for the classes of cases in which it was employed
prior to the adoption of the constitution, of which eminent do-
main is not one.56
II
THE PROBLEM
A. Litigating Condemnation Cases
The exercise of the power of eminent domain can result in a
trial in several circumstances, including when the condemnee is
dissatisfied with the compensation offered by the condemner.57
53 Id. at 146, 1879 WL 1242, at *4.  A careful review of Oregon appellate court
opinions regarding this issue turns up a case decided by the Oregon Supreme Court
only two years after Kendall , Oregonian Railway Co. v. Hill , 9 Or. 377 (1881), avail-
able at  1881 WL 1398.  Interestingly, the court deciding this case was of an entirely
different makeup from that which decided Kendall .  Although the opinion in Hill
refers to assessment of damages by a jury, this case stands only for the principle that
a trial to determine compensation is required to comply with the statute authorizing
condemnation of private property by a private corporation. See Oregonian Ry. Co. ,
9 Or. at 385-86, 1881 WL 1398, at *6.  Since the circuit court had issued a default
judgment against the condemnee, the measure of damages was fixed by the value of
the land given by the private corporation (condemner) in its answer, rather than
being assessed by either a court or jury. Id.  at 378-79, 1881 WL 1398, at *2.  Further-
more, regardless of this defect, the court concluded that the circuit court could not
issue a judgment that conveyed the private property to the condemner without the
condemner first compensating the property owner for the taking. Id.  at 385, 1881
WL 1398, at *6.
54 216 Or. 204, 208, 336 P.2d 39, 41 (1959).
55 Id. at 228, 336 P.2d at 50.
56 Id. at 225, 336 P.2d at 49.
57 See  7 NICHOLS, supra  note 17, § G1.05.  First, the condemnee may believe that R
the taking was unjustified or improperly carried out, and may wish to challenge the
methods employed by the condemner, or to challenge its authority to condemn.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 11 17-MAY-07 13:29
2006] Missing from Oregon’s Takings Clause 1073
Although the condemner must first negotiate with the con-
demnee, if the condemnee refuses to accept the condemner’s of-
fer of compensation, the condemner is actually the party that
files the lawsuit to have the measure of “just compensation” de-
termined in a judicial proceeding.58  While there is no constitu-
tional right to a jury trial, as discussed in Part I.C, is either party
to an eminent domain action allowed to request one?  Is a judge
allowed to grant such a request?  To answer these questions as
they relate to condemnation proceedings in Oregon, one must be
familiar with the relevant statutes, which are the subjects of anal-
ysis in the next section of this Comment.  If both questions are
answered in the affirmative, either the condemnee or the con-
demner is permitted to request a jury trial if that party believes
that a jury will return a more favorable award of compensation
than a judge.
The U.S. system of jury trial has been criticized for returning
high damage awards or being too prone to display undue sympa-
thy for aggrieved parties.59  Thus, a condemnee’s preference for a
jury determination of compensation would not be surprising.
However, since the focus of this Comment is on measuring compensation, these
other items are not discussed.  Several issues in eminent domain actions must be
determined as a matter of law by the court.  For example, in Oregon, public use and
necessity are two issues that must be decided by the judge as a matter of law and
should never be submitted to a jury for determination. E.g. , Moore Mill & Lumber
Co. , 216 Or. at 227, 228, 336 P.2d at 49, 50 (stating that the court is “aware of no
enactment which authorizes the jury to resolve the issue of necessity” and also that
the court “deem[s] it firmly established that whether a proposed taking is for a pub-
lic use is a question for the court and not for a jury, even in a jury trial” (quoting
Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 212 Or. 596, 612, 321 P.2d 338, 346 (1958))).  How-
ever, other issues remain questions of fact, including the compensation owed to the
property owner for the taking.  Under both Oregon and federal law, the amount of
damages in a civil case is typically an issue of fact to be determined by the jury. See,
e.g. , Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 73-74, 987 P.2d 463, 470, clarified on
reconsideration , 329 Or. 369, 987 P.2d 476 (1999).  However, Oregon’s constitutional
provisions guaranteeing a right to a jury trial only prohibit the legislature from abro-
gating the jury’s assessment in civil cases in which the right to jury trial was custom-
ary in 1857. Id.
58 See, e.g. , 7 NICHOLS, supra  note 17, § G1.06, at G1-9–10; OR. REV. STAT. R
§ 35.245(1), (2) (2005). There are three fora before which an eminent domain action
could be tried:  board of commissioners, judge sitting as fact finder in a bench trial,
and jury. See  8A NICHOLS, supra  note 17, § G23.04[4]. R
59 Hannan v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 4 Or. App. 178, 181, 471 P.2d 831, 832-33
(1970).  These presumed tendencies of the jury result in one of two things:  either
undeserving claimants receive money to which they are not entitled, or claimants
receive more money than what is warranted by their injuries. See 7 NICHOLS, supra
note 17, § G3.05 (discussing the various prejudices and attitudes that jurors bring to R
condemnation proceedings).
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However, the condemner might also prefer a jury trial.60  The
Oregon Court of Appeals observed this trend in Oregon in a
workers’ compensation opinion:
[I]t is interesting to note that as a matter of common knowl-
edge . . . for many years past a large number of automobile
liability insurers defending personal injury claims have de-
manded their right to trial by jury—even though many plain-
tiffs, on the advice of experienced counsel, have offered to
waive jury and submit their claims to a trial judge sitting with-
out a jury. The same has been true of the Oregon State High-
way Division which commonly insists on its right to trial by jury
when it seeks to acquire property by means of condemnation
proceedings .61
Whatever the reasons condemnees and condemners would have
for preferring a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings, and
whether jury trials actually result in more favorable outcomes for
one party or the other, is not the subject of this Comment.  None-
theless, it seems likely that some eminent domain litigants,
whether the state or aggrieved property owners, will continue to
request a jury determination of compensation even if that is the
only issue to be resolved.  It also seems likely that Oregon’s
popularly elected trial judges will continue to impanel juries to
determine compensation in eminent domain proceedings so long
as the requests go unchallenged by opposing parties and suffi-
cient judicial resources exist.  Nevertheless, potential parties to a
condemnation action in Oregon should be concerned with
whether this “business as usual” approach is grounded in statu-
tory requirements or whether it would give way if challenged in
the courts.
B. No Right to Have a Jury Determine “Just Compensation”
As discussed in Part I.C.2, Oregon’s constitution contains no
guarantee to a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding.  Thus,
for a party to argue that a jury, and not a judge, must ascertain
compensation in an eminent domain proceeding, some Oregon
statute must require a jury determination of compensation.
1. Procedural Rules
Juries are referenced in several places throughout the Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP).  Several of these provisions
60 See Hannan , 4 Or. App. at 181, 471 P.2d at 833.
61 Id. at 181, 471 P.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
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merely codify the constitutional provisions that preserve the
common law right to a jury trial and do not expand the right
beyond that;62 others merely prescribe procedures for jury tri-
als.63  Two provisions are relevant to the inquiry of this Comment
and require close examination.  First, ORCP 51 C(2) provides
that either the court or a party may move to deny a jury trial
request if a constitutional or statutory right to a jury determina-
tion of those issues of fact does not exist.64  Second, ORCP 51 D
provides that, upon consent by all of the parties, an advisory jury
may be impaneled even in the absence of a right to jury trial.65
Neither of these provisions guarantees anything beyond the Ore-
gon Constitution.  Therefore, if one of the parties does not con-
sent to an advisory jury, the trial judge can commence a bench
trial even on the measure of just compensation, which is a ques-
tion of fact.66
2. Statutory Interpretation Analysis
To interpret an Oregon statute, a court must follow a three-
step analysis to discern the intent of the legislature.67  In the first
step, a court must examine the actual text of the statute, because
62 See, e.g. , OR. R. CIV. P. 50 (“The right of trial by jury as declared by the Ore-
gon Constitution or as given by a statute shall be preserved to the parties invio-
late.”); OR. R. CIV. P. 51 C(1) (providing an exception for the trial of factual issues
by a jury if “[t]he parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed
with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the re-
cord, consent to trial without a jury”).
63 See, e.g. , OR. R. CIV. P. 56 (specifying when a twelve-person, as opposed to six-
person, jury is called for in circuit court jury trials based upon the amount in contro-
versy); OR. R. CIV. P. 57 (outlining the process by which a party may challenge
compliance with juror-selection procedures and dictating the number and conduct of
peremptory challenges); OR. R. CIV. P. 58 B (addressing the appropriate procedure
for jury trials including sequestration of the jury and the process for utilizing alter-
nate jurors); OR. R. CIV. P. 59 (regarding jury instructions and deliberations).
64 OR. R. CIV. P. 51 C(2) (providing an exception for the trial of factual issues by
the jury if “[t]he court, upon motion of a party or on its own initiative, finds that a
right of trial by jury of some or all of the issues does not exist under the Constitution
or statutes of this state”).
65 OR. R. CIV. P. 51 D (“In all actions not triable by right to a jury, the court, upon
motion of a party or on its own initiative, may try an issue with an advisory jury or it
may, with the consent of all parties, order a trial to a jury whose verdict shall have
the same effect as if trial to a jury had been a matter of right.”).
66 State v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 574, 825 P.2d 641, 645 (1992).
67 See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 610-12,
859 P.2d 1143, 1145-47 (1993).  In Portland General Electric , the Oregon Supreme
Court analyzed a statute by looking at its text and context and determined that the
intent of the legislature was clear. Id. at 614, 859 P.2d at 1148.  Thus, the case only
illustrates the court’s examination at the first step of analysis.
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the statutory provision itself is the best evidence of the legisla-
ture’s intent.68  A court considers rules of statutory construction,
including:  (1) to attribute plain meaning to words of common
usage, and (2) “not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit
what has been inserted.”69
Also in this first step, the context of the statutory provision is
examined.70  This includes other provisions within the same stat-
ute as well as other related statutes.71  When doing so, a court
again considers rules of statutory construction, including:  (1) the
“use of a term in one section and not in another section of the
same statute indicates a purposeful omission,” and (2) “where
there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”72  If the legisla-
ture’s intent is clear after completing this first step, a court must
stop its examination.73  However, if the legislature’s intent is un-
clear, a court must consider legislative history and maxims of
statutory construction to resolve the uncertainty.74
3. Overview of Oregon’s Condemnation Statutes
Statutes that apply to eminent domain proceedings appear in
several places throughout Oregon’s statutory code, Oregon Re-
vised Statutes (ORS).  The procedure for acquiring private prop-
erty through the exercise of the power of eminent domain in
Oregon is set forth in Oregon’s General Condemnation Proce-
dure Act,75 codified in chapter 35.  The Act provides that:
[I]f the board [condemning property] and the owner of such
property cannot agree upon the price to be paid for the
amount of or interest in the property required for such public
use, and the damages for the taking thereof, the board may
request the Attorney General to, and the Attorney General
shall when so requested, commence and prosecute in any
68 Id. at 610, 859 P.2d at 1146.
69 Id. at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that this
rule of statutory construction is required by law in Oregon under ORS 174.010).
70 Id.  at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146.
71 Id.  at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146.
72 Id.  at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting OR.
REV. STAT. § 174.010 (1991)).
73 Id. at 611-12, 859 P.2d at 1146.
74 Id. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1146.
75 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 35.205-.625 (2005).  This Act applies to both “private con-
demners” (private corporations that have been granted the power to exercise emi-
nent domain by the sovereign), as well as “public condemners” (condemners other
than private condemners). See id. § 35.215(4), (6).
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court of competent jurisdiction in the name of the State of Or-
egon any necessary or appropriate suit, action or proceeding
for the condemnation of the amount of or interest in the prop-
erty required for such purposes and for the assessment of the
damages for the taking thereof.76
The Act also provides that, except for procedures in ORS chap-
ter 368 involving county roads,77 “any action for the condemna-
tion of property under the power of eminent domain shall be
conducted according to this chapter.”78  Therefore, any guaran-
tee of a jury determination of compensation in eminent domain
proceedings must necessarily be found in one of these chapters to
be valid.79
Five provisions of the General Condemnation Procedure Act
contain references to juries, several of which are, admittedly,
made in association with compensation:
1. “Unless the case is submitted by both sides to the jury  with-
out argument, the party who presents evidence first shall also
open and close the argument to the jury”;80
2. “If motion is made by either party before the formation of
the jury , the court shall order a view of the property in ques-
tion; and, upon the return of the jury , the evidence of the
parties may be heard and the verdict of the jury  given”;81
3. “Upon the assessment of the compensation by the jury , the
court shall give judgment appropriating the property in ques-
tion to the condemner, conditioned upon the condemner’s
paying into court the compensation assessed by the jury”;82
4. “If the defendant withdraws the compensation awarded by
the court or jury , the defendant waives the right of appeal”;83
and
5. “Upon the determination of the price for repurchase by the
court or jury , the court shall give judgment vesting title to
the property in the owner or the beneficiary, conditioned
upon payment into court of the assessed price by the owner
76 Id. § 35.555.
77 See id. §§ 368.001-.990.
78 Id. § 35.375.
79 See id.
80 Id. § 35.305(1) (emphasis added) (referring to evidence and quantum of proof
in eminent domain actions).
81 Id. § 35.315 (emphasis added).
82 Id. § 35.325 (emphasis added).
83 Id. § 35.365 (emphasis added).
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or beneficiary.”84
However, not all references to compensation within Oregon’s
condemnation statutes are associated with juries.  Although
chapter 368 specifically guarantees that compensation be pro-
vided to property owners whose land is affected by construction
or maintenance of roads, it does so without reference to the word
“jury.”85
While the General Condemnation Procedure Act dictates that
only provisions within that Act and chapter 368 include proce-
dures for condemnation proceedings,86 “jury” is also mentioned
two times in chapter 276, a section of the code regarding con-
demnation of private property for the purpose of providing a
public water supply:
1. “When it appears that the Oregon Department of Adminis-
trative Services has offered the defendant, before commenc-
ing the action, an amount equal to or greater than that
assessed by the jury , the state shall recover its costs and dis-
bursements from the defendant”;87 and
2. “The reasonable rental value for such time shall be assessed
by the jury , if the case is tried before a jury , otherwise by the
court. . . . Such reasonable rental value shall be included in
the general damages allowed by the court or jury .”88
Although proceedings under chapter 276 must conform proce-
durally to chapter 35,89 the provisions of chapter 276 have not
been specifically incorporated into the General Condemnation
Procedure Act.  Therefore, it is not clear that these provisions
84 Id. § 35.400(3)(d)(A) (emphasis added) (referring to the procedure for judg-
ment for repurchase).
85 See id. § 368.211.  In particular, chapter 368 provides that “[a] county governing
body shall provide for compensation under this section to any person who has estab-
lished a structure on real property if the structure encroaches on a road that is the
subject of legalization proceedings.” Id. § 368.211(1).
86 Id. § 35.375 (“Except for procedures provided in ORS chapter 368, any action
for the condemnation of property under the power of eminent domain shall be con-
ducted according to this chapter.”).
87 Id. § 276.240(2) (emphasis added).
88 Id. § 276.240(3) (emphasis added) (referring to the condemner’s possession of
property during the pendency of condemnation proceedings).
89 Id. § 276.240(1) (confirming that condemnation proceedings must conform to
the procedures set forth in the General Condemnation Procedure Act by requiring
that “[i]n any condemnation procedures under ORS 276.234 to 276.244, the practice,
pleadings, forms and modes of procedure shall conform as near as may be applicable
to the practice, pleading[s], forms and procedure prescribed for the appropriation of
real property by private corporations in ORS chapter 35”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 17 17-MAY-07 13:29
2006] Missing from Oregon’s Takings Clause 1079
have any weight at all in determining condemnation procedures,
particularly procedures not involving public water works.
4. Interpretation of Oregon’s Condemnation Statutes
Applying the statutory interpretation analysis discussed in Part
II.B.2 to Oregon’s condemnation statutes reveals an ambiguity
regarding the role of a jury in eminent domain proceedings.
First, the actual text of the condemnation statutes does not
clearly express a legislative intent to guarantee a jury determina-
tion of compensation in eminent domain proceedings.  This is ev-
ident when applying the “rules of construction of the statutory
text that bear directly on how to read the text.”90  The rules de-
scribed in Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor &
Industries  (to attribute plain meaning to common words and “not
to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been in-
serted”)91 are useful in analyzing the actual text of Oregon’s con-
demnation statutes.
The five provisions in Oregon’s General Condemnation Proce-
dure Act that include references to juries use “the” as the article
to “jury.”92  Relying upon plain meaning, the meaning of “the
jury” seems different from “a jury.”  One interpretation is that
the latter refers to any jury, or a jury generally, while the former
refers to the specific jury impaneled for a particular condemna-
tion proceeding.  To illustrate, were ORS 35.325 to read “[u]pon
the assessment of the compensation by a jury” rather than
“[u]pon the assessment of the compensation by the jury,”93 the
plain meaning might be very different.  Using the definite article
“the” as the limiting adjective for “jury” points to a specific
jury—most likely the jury that has been selected to hear a partic-
ular condemnation case.  Had the legislature instead used “a,” an
90 Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d
1143, 1146 (1993).
91 Id.  at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (1991)).
92 In English grammar parlance, “the” and “a” are both “articles.”  “An article is
a limiting adjective that precedes a noun or noun phrase and determines the noun’s
or phrase’s use to indicate something definite (the) or indefinite (a  or an).” THE
CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 5.69 (15th ed. 2003).  As a definite article, “the”
“points to a definite object that (1) is so well understood that it does not need
description . . . ; (2) is a thing that is about to be described . . . ; or (3) is important
. . . .” Id.  ¶ 5.70 (examples omitted).  Conversely, as an indefinite article, “a”
“points to nonspecific objects, things, or persons that are not distinguished from the
other members of a class.” Id.  ¶ 5.71.
93 § 35.325.
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indefinite article, these references would point to a nonspecific
jury and would appear to contemplate juries in every condemna-
tion proceeding.  However, one could also argue that the definite
article “the” evinces nothing more than a presupposition by the
legislature of the involvement of a jury in condemnation
proceedings.
Two of the provisions clearly anticipate a finding of compensa-
tion by either the judge or the jury, thereby obfuscating this pre-
sumption of a jury.  One provision determines that a defendant
waives the right of appeal upon withdrawal of “the compensation
awarded by the court or jury.”94  Another provision provides that
the court shall allow an owner to buy back the property “[u]pon
determination of the price for repurchase by the court or jury.”95
Since a court undertaking a statutory interpretation may not
“omit what has been inserted,” the inclusion of “court or jury”
instead of just “jury” in some of the provisions must be given
considerable weight in discerning the intent of the legislature.
Just as it seems that the legislature anticipated a determination of
compensation by a jury, it also seems to have anticipated a deter-
mination of compensation by the judge as well.
Perhaps the clearest support for an interpretation that Ore-
gon’s condemnation statutes guarantee a right to jury determina-
tion of compensation is ORS 35.325, which contains the
following introductory clause, “[u]pon the assessment of the
compensation by the jury.”96  However, this precise provision
was construed by the Oregon Supreme Court in Moore Mill .97
In that case, the court was tasked with determining whether ne-
cessity was an issue that must be decided by the jury.98  For this
reason, the court identified every provision that discussed the
jury and noted that all of them were associated with compensa-
tion.99  The court concluded that this must mean that a jury, if
there is a jury, only decides compensation and not necessity.100
Upon review of ORS 35.100, the Oregon Supreme Court com-
94 Id. § 35.365.
95 Id. § 35.400(3)(d)(A).
96 Id. § 35.325.
97 Moore Mill & Lumber Co. v. Foster, 216 Or. 204, 227, 336 P.2d 39, 49-50 (1959).
98 Id. at 222, 336 P.2d at 47.
99 See id. at 227-28, 336 P.2d at 49-50.  Although the court uses the term “dam-
ages,” the context of the case makes clear that the court is discussing just compensa-
tion. See id.  at 226-28, 336 P.2d at 49-50.
100 Id. at 228, 336 P.2d at 50.
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mented that it “appears to state the function which the jury
serves” in condemnation proceedings.101  Thus, even the Oregon
Supreme Court in Moore Mill  was unable to state definitively
that a right to a jury trial for compensation was granted by the
statutes.  For these reasons, the actual text of Oregon’s condem-
nation statutes does not demonstrate a clear legislative intent to
ensure that compensation must be determined by the jury.
Furthermore, the context of the condemnation statutes does
not clearly express a legislative intent to guarantee a jury deter-
mination of compensation in eminent domain proceedings.  This
is evident when applying the “rules of construction that bear di-
rectly on the interpretation of the statutory provision in con-
text.”102  The rules described in Portland General Electric  are
useful in analyzing the context of Oregon’s condemnation stat-
utes:  (1) “that use of a term in one section and not in another
section of the same statute indicates a purposeful omission,” and
(2) “where there are several provisions or particulars such con-
struction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”103
First, upon examination of the context of these statutes, there
is at least one purposeful omission that is relevant to the issue of
guaranteeing a jury determination of compensation.  Side-by-side
in the same chapter as these provisions that reference the jury,
ORS 35.235(4) provides an example of the legislature assigning
an issue to either the court or the jury:
The question of the validity of the disputable presumptions
[necessity of proposed use, necessity of the property for that
proposed use, and that the proposed use is most compatible
with the greatest public good and the least private injury], if
raised, shall be determined by the court in a summary proceed-
ing prior to trial.104
The legislature specifically stated that particular issues are only
to be determined by the court.  By contrast, none of the provi-
sions that include references to juries contain similar language to
that quoted above.105  Although the legislature included refer-
ences to “jury” in ORS 35.315, and “jury” and “compensation” in
101 Id. at 227, 336 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
102 Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 611, 859
P.2d 1143, 1146 (1993).
103 Id.  at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (1991)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
104 OR. REV. STAT. § 35.235(4) (2005) (emphasis added).
105 See id. §§ 35.205-.625.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 20 17-MAY-07 13:29
1082 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 1063
35.325 and 35.365, none of those sections state anything to the
effect that compensation shall be determined by the jury.106  On
the other hand, the legislature explicitly assigned certain issues to
the court but did not explicitly assign the determination of com-
pensation to the court.  This could be used as evidence to support
an interpretation that compensation must be determined by a
jury instead of a court.  However, the specific assignments to the
court include presumptions, whereas the amount of compensa-
tion is an issue of fact to be determined at trial, providing an
explanation for the omission that does not import a specific
intent.
The provisions in chapter 276 regarding condemnation proce-
dures, while superfluous, largely follow this same analysis.  Al-
though this chapter provides that the rental value due for the
property occupied during the pendency of the condemnation
proceedings before compensation is determined and paid “shall
be assessed by the jury,” this provision goes on to state that this
is only in cases that are tried before a jury.107  One of the rules of
statutory construction is to give preference for an interpretation
that would give an effect to all provisions.  Therefore, since only
chapters 35 and 368 dictate condemnation procedures, the pre-
ferred interpretation of the provisions in chapter 276 is that com-
pensation of rental value should be determined by a jury only if
there is a jury, rather than guaranteeing a right to a jury determi-
nation of compensation.
Admittedly, the Oregon legislature did seem to anticipate jury
determinations of compensation, since it made provisions for
how these jury trials are to proceed.  Consequently, it is not obvi-
ous that the Oregon legislature intended not  to guarantee a jury
trial on the issue of compensation in eminent domain actions.
However, the provisions referencing the jury in condemnation
proceedings seem purely procedural in nature and only address
what happens once a jury is actually impaneled, rather than actu-
ally guaranteeing a right to a jury determination of
compensation.
If the legislative intent is unclear after examining the text and
context of the statute, a court must turn next to legislative intent.
If intent is still unclear after that, a court must resort to maxims
of statutory construction.  It is not the purpose of this Comment
106 See id. §§ 35.315, .325, .365.
107 Id. § 276.240(3).
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to conduct an analysis of the issue on this level of statutory inter-
pretation.  Rather, the purpose of this Comment is to demon-
strate that the text of the statutes are ambiguous and that it
would be preferable for the statutes to clearly state whether a
right to have a jury determine the amount of compensation exists
in an eminent domain proceeding.  If the legislature or citizens of
Oregon intend to guarantee a jury trial or preclude one, they
should do so explicitly, rather than rely upon a court to review
the legislative history of the statutes to discern the legislative in-
tent.  Not only would this ensure that courts “get it right,” but it
would proactively address the uncertainty and serve as a preemp-
tive strike against unnecessary litigation regarding this issue.
B. Neighboring States’ Responses:  Washington and California
Many state constitutions include an explicit guarantee to a jury
determination of compensation in eminent domain proceed-
ings,108 obviating the need for a statutory analysis like the one in
108 E.g. , ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17 (“[C]ompensation shall be ascertained by a
jury , unless a jury be waived as in other civil cases in courts of record . . . .”) (empha-
sis added); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (“Such compensation shall be ascertained by a
board of commissioners, of not less than three freeholders, or by a jury, when re-
quired by the owner of the property . . . .”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18 (“Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being
made, or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be
assessed by a jury , who shall not take into consideration any advantages that may
result to said owner on account of the improvement for which it is taken.”) (empha-
sis added); LA. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. B (“In every expropriation, a party has the right
to trial by jury to determine compensation , and the owner shall be compensated to
the full extent of his loss.”) (emphasis added); MD. CONST. art. III, § 40 (“The Gen-
eral Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded
by a Jury , being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.”)
(emphasis added); MO. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“Such compensation shall be ascertained
by a jury or board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders . . . .”); N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be
waived.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19 (providing that “such compensation shall be
assessed by a jury”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24 (providing that “compensation shall
be ascertained by a board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders” but
that “[t]he commissioners shall be selected from the regular jury list  of names pre-
pared and made as the Legislature shall provide”) (emphasis added); VA. CONST.
art. I, § 11 (noting at the end of the constitutional provision containing the state’s
takings clause “[t]hat in controversies respecting property . . . trial by jury is prefera-
ble to any other, and ought to be held sacred”); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9 (guaran-
teeing that “such compensation shall be ascertained by an impartial jury of twelve
freeholders”).  Some states only explicitly guarantee a jury determination of com-
pensation when property is taken by a municipal or private corporation as opposed
to the government itself. E.g. , ALA. CONST. art. XII, § 235 (providing that a jury
determination of damages is guaranteed to all parties in appeals involving
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the section above.  Washington’s takings clause has guaranteed a
jury determination of compensation since the Washington Con-
stitution was adopted in 1889.  Its framers appeared to establish
an independent constitution that secured the same fundamental
rights for Washingtonians that were enjoyed by other citizens of
the Union at that time.109  Because the U.S. Bill of Rights did not
apply to the states when the Washington Constitutional Conven-
tion convened in 1889, it is unlikely that the framers contem-
plated that the Federal Constitution would affect the
interpretation of Washington’s constitution in any significant
way.110  Consequently, the Washington Constitution contains an
expansive takings clause that provides in relevant part:  “No pri-
vate property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having been first made . . . which com-
pensation shall be ascertained by a jury , unless a jury be waived,
as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the manner pre-
scribed by law.”111  Clearly more expansive in scope than its fed-
eral counterpart, Washington’s takings clause provides greater
protection to Washingtonians and prescribes in detail the process
by which private property can be taken for public use.112
Another of Oregon’s next-door neighbors, California, has a
similar provision.  California’s first constitution, adopted in 1849,
included a takings clause that mirrored the Federal Takings
Clause.113  Subsequently, the California Constitutional Conven-
“[m]unicipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege of
taking property for public use”); ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 9 (providing that when
property is taken for use by “any corporation” that compensation “shall be ascer-
tained by a jury of twelve men”).  However, most state constitutions, including Ore-
gon’s, “merely provide that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, or shall
continue as theretofore practiced.”  1A NICHOLS, supra  note 17, § 4.105[3]. These R
states’ takings clauses, like Oregon’s, merely guarantee the right to just compensa-
tion but do not explicitly guarantee an assessment of compensation by a jury. Id.
109 Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System:  Perspec-
tives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights , 7 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 491, 498 (1984).
110 Id.
111 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
112 See generally  Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism
and Modern Government:  The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights , 75
WASH. L. REV. 857 (2000) (discussing the conflict between property rights and the
police power in light of the U.S. and Washington Constitutions); Utter, supra note
109.
113 See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 8, available at  http://www.ss.ca.gov/archives/
level3_const1849txt.html (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.”).
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tion of 1879 amended the state’s takings clause to include a
clause requiring that a jury ascertain the measure of compensa-
tion.114  The clause provides:  “Private property may be taken or
damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained
by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for,
the owner.”115  The mere existence of this clear and unambiguous
language demonstrates how states have provided further protec-
tion than that afforded by the Federal Takings Clause.
III
LOOKING AHEAD
A. Oregon’s Changing Eminent Domain Landscape:
Measure 37
At this point, no reported decision by an Oregon appellate
court has ever reviewed a trial judge’s denial of a jury trial in a
condemnation case to determine the measure of compensa-
tion.116  However, Oregon’s eminent domain landscape appears
to be changing.  In the 2004 general election, Oregon voters
passed Measure 37.117  The ballot measure, now codified as ORS
114 California’s takings clause was article I, section 8 in 1849, but it is currently
article I, section 19.  Since California only introduced the popular initiative in 1911,
the decision to amend the state’s takings clause to include a jury trial guarantee was
made by the delegates and not by the populace, see Pat Ooley, An Overview of the
History of Constitutional Provisions Dealing with State Governance , in CAL. CONSTI-
TUTION REVISION COMM’N, CONSTITUTION HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (1996),
available at http://www.library.ca.gov/CCRC/reports/html/hs_state_governance.html
(follow “History” hyperlink under “Commission Final Report” section).  Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court of California declared that the state constitution re-
quired that compensation be “found and fixed by a jury” and that this had been
followed in California courts “without deviation.”  People v. Ricciardi, 144 P.2d 799,
805 (Cal. 1943).
115 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (emphasis added).
116 A Westlaw key search of “eminent domain,” “proceedings to take property
and assess compensation,” “mode of assessment of compensation,” and “trial by
jury,” yielded zero relevant results for Oregon.  To recreate this search on Westlaw,
begin by clicking on the “KeySearch” tab; select the “West Key Number System”;
expand the topic-key number “Eminent Domain 148”; expand “Proceedings to take
property and assess compensation”; expand “Mode of assessment of compensation”;
then check the “Trial by jury” box and click “Search selected”; select the “State”
radio button for jurisdiction and select “Oregon” from the drop-down menu; then
click “Search.” See also  Moore Mill & Lumber Co. v. Foster, 216 Or. 204, 227, 336
P.2d 39, 50 (1959) (stating in dicta that “[w]e have seen that the assessment of dam-
ages may be  a proper subject for jury determination if a statute so declares”) (em-
phasis added).
117 MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 340 Or. 117, 121, 130 P.3d 308, 311
(2006); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., DLCD Measure 37 Legal Informa-
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197.352, amends Oregon’s land use laws to entitle a property
owner to “just compensation” when a land use regulation, en-
acted subsequent to the owner’s acquisition of the property, re-
stricts the property’s use and reduces its fair market value.118
The government may choose to waive the regulation in lieu of
providing compensation.119
As of April 12, 2007, 6680 claims have been filed under Mea-
sure 37,120 and more than $14,959,251 has been requested as total
compensation for these claims.121  As of November 2006, all valid
claims have been “compensated” with a regulation waiver,122
with the exception of a couple offered $47,750 by the City of
Prineville as compensation for not allowing them to build a
three-bedroom house on their property.123  As of the writing of
this Comment, over one hundred Measure 37 cases naming the
State of Oregon as a party were pending in Oregon’s circuit
courts.124  Since the deadline for claims against regulations en-
acted prior to December 2, 2004, has passed,125 the current tra-
tion, Information About the Election, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/
legal_information.shtml#Information_About_the_Election (last visited Feb. 17,
2007) [hereinafter DLCD Legal Information].  The measure became effective thirty
days after the election on December 2, 2004, but a county circuit court judge de-
clared the law unconstitutional in October 2005.  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin.
Servs., Civil No. 05C10444, (Cir. Ct. Marion County, Or., Oct. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37.pdf.  The Oregon Supreme
Court granted direct review of the appeal, and, in an opinion issued on February 21,
2006, reversed the decision of the county circuit court judge and reinstated Measure
37. MacPherson , 340 Or. at 122, 130 P.3d at 312; Laura Oppenheimer, It’s Settled:
Measure 37 Lives , OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb. 22, 2006, at A1.  Measure 37 was
again effective on March 13, 2006. See  DLCD Legal Information, supra , at Su-
preme Court Reinstates Measure 37 (Mar. 9, 2006), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/
MEASURE37/legal_information.shtml#Supreme_Court_Reinstates_Measure_37
(providing March 13, 2006, as the date the circuit court entered its judgment on
remand).
118 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005).
119 Id. § 197.352(8).
120 Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., DLCD Measure 37 Summaries of
Claims (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/summaries_of
_claims.shtml.
121 Id.
122 E-mail from Michael Morrissey, Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., to
author (Nov. 19, 2006, 12:17 PST) (on file with author).
123 Matthew Preusch, Prineville Offers Measure 37 Pay , OREGONIAN (Portland),
Oct. 26, 2006, at A1.
124 Or. Dep’t of Justice, Pending Measure 37 Litigation, http://www.doj.state
.or.us/hot_topics/measure37litigation.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (noting that
“[t]he list does not include cases involving local governments where the state is not a
party”).
125 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(5) (2005) (providing that Measure 37 claimants
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jectory will likely not continue.126  However, given the volume of
pending litigation, the amount of time the appellate process con-
sumes, and any additional claims made regarding newly enacted
land use regulations, it is likely that the Oregon judicial system
will be dealing with issues presented by Measure 37 for some
time to come.
The extensive amount of litigation caused by the passage of
Measure 37 begs the question:  Which procedures must be fol-
lowed in a Measure 37 trial?  More precisely, must a jury deter-
mine the amount of “just compensation” due to a Measure 37
claimant?  Measure 37 is a statutory remedy and not a cause of
action that was tried to a jury at common law prior to the adop-
tion of the Oregon Constitution.  Consequently, Measure 37 liti-
gants possess no constitutional right to a jury trial.  Thus, for
Measure 37 litigants to possess a right to a jury trial, the right
must be provided by statute.  There are three possible sources for
a statutory right to a jury trial in Measure 37 cases:  (1) the text
of Measure 37 itself, (2) the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure
(ORCP), and (3) Oregon’s condemnation statutes.
As for the first option, the text of Measure 37 does not specify
how “just compensation” is to be determined.127  Nor does the
measure make any reference to the use of a jury.128  Second, as
discussed in Part II.B.1, the ORCP provide no guarantee to a
jury trial beyond that contained in Oregon’s constitutional and
statutory provisions.
Third, to determine whether a Measure 37 litigant possesses a
right to a jury trial, it would be reasonable to analogize Measure
must make “written demand” regarding such regulations within two years of Mea-
sure 37’s enactment).  Although some parties argued that the litigation over Mea-
sure 37’s constitutionality tolled the statute’s two-year deadline for land use
regulations enacted before December 2, 2004, Oregon’s governmental bodies ap-
peared to treat December 4, 2006, as the deadline for claims against such regula-
tions.  League of Or. Cities & Ass’n of Or. Counties, Joint Statement Concerning
Measure 37 Claims Filed After December 4, 2006 , http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/
MEASURE37/docs/general/joint_m37_loc_aoc_dlcd_statement_112206.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2007).
126 See Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., supra  note 120 (providing the
following statistics:  6680 claims as of April 12, 2007; 3182 claims as of November 17,
2006; 2724 claims as of October 20, 2006; 2636 claims as of October 13, 2006; 2412
claims as of September 15, 2006; 2359 claims as of September 8, 2006; 2234 claims as
of August 18, 2006; 2205 claims as of August 11, 2006; 1994 claims as of July 7, 2006;
1809 claims as of June 2, 2006; 1605 claims as of April 21, 2006).
127 See § 197.352.
128 See id.
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37 cases to condemnation cases and rely upon Oregon’s condem-
nation statutes.  Measure 37 simply extends the meaning of in-
verse condemnation, which is defined as an uncompensated
taking of private property for public use.129  Prior to Measure 37,
Oregon property owners did not have a claim of inverse condem-
nation unless the action took the entire value of the property.130
However, Measure 37 entitles property owners to compensation
for a decrease in value of property caused by a wide array of
government regulations.131  Furthermore, the use of the term
“just compensation” in the text of the measure appears to implic-
itly invoke eminent domain jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, assert-
ing a right to a jury trial in a Measure 37 case based upon
Oregon’s condemnation statutes is fraught with difficulties.  Even
if a court accepts the analogy, it must analyze the condemnation
statutes for a jury trial guarantee, and, as this Comment has ar-
gued, that search is likely to uncover ambiguities rather than a
definitive guarantee.
Admittedly, statutory ambiguity would likely not persuade a
trial judge to deny a request of a Measure 37 litigant to have a
jury determine compensation.132  As stated earlier, no evidence
to date indicates that a trial judge has ever denied a request for a
jury trial of compensation in a condemnation case despite the
ambiguity of the statutes.  This makes sense.  Oregon’s condem-
nation statutes are to be strictly construed because the exercise
of the power of eminent domain is in “derogation of vested
rights.”133  Additionally, many people are highly critical of any
attempt to abrogate the right to trial by jury, considered “democ-
racy’s cornerstone,” even in civil cases.134  Even though special
interest lobbies have attempted to erode the right to a jury trial,
juries are still considered critical decisionmakers in civil cases for
129 Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 189 Or. App. 499, 510, 76 P.3d 677, 684
(2003) (“An action for inverse condemnation is one for damages asserted against a
governmental entity with the power of eminent domain that has taken private prop-
erty for public use without initiating condemnation proceedings, that is, without pay-
ing just compensation.”), review denied , 336 Or. 406 (2004).
130 See id.
131 See § 197.352.
132 Since compensation is the sole focus of this Comment, this Comment does not
explore the ways in which this argument can be extended to other issues within a
Measure 37 case.
133 City of Portland v. Kamm, 132 Or. 317, 320, 285 P. 236, 237 (1930).
134 See, e.g. , Richard J. Vangelisti, Trial by Jury:  Democracy’s Cornerstone , OR.
ST. B. BULL., Apr. 2005, available at  http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/
05apr/parting.html.
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a number of reasons.135  The most important reason may be to
maintain the balance of power between the people and their gov-
ernment, because the jury trial is an “important bulwark against
tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the
whim of the sovereign.”136  Thus, in a “close case,” such as a
jury’s role in determining compensation, a court would likely err
on the side of allowing the jury trial.
Nonetheless, it is possible that courts’ predispositions toward
juries might change given the impacts of Measure 37.  Perhaps no
litigant has challenged a judge’s decision to conduct a jury trial of
compensation in an eminent domain proceeding.  However, the
ORCP provide an avenue for a litigant to challenge such a deci-
sion.137  Given the popular support of Measure 37 when it was
passed, it seems plausible that the governing body denying a
waiver under Measure 37 might prefer to litigate the issue of just
compensation before a judge rather than a jury.  Thus, the judge
would be forced to justify his or her decision to impanel a jury,
rather than doing so merely as a matter of course.
Furthermore, although still a relatively small portion of the
cases heard in Oregon’s trial courts,138 Measure 37 cases are in-
deed increasing the amount of litigation in Oregon, which, in
turn, increases the strain on judicial resources.139  Since the con-
duct of a jury trial is more time-consuming than a bench trial, a
trial judge preferring to resolve cases as quickly and efficiently as
possible might deny a jury trial to achieve judicial efficiency.
135 See id.
136 Id. (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979)). Sover-
eign immunity is not an issue for several reasons.  First of all, by their very nature
condemnation proceedings are not suits against the sovereign, since it is the state or
the state agency acting as condemner that is actually filing the lawsuit.  Furthermore,
the state is consenting to this suit.  The state never asserts that it is immune from suit
and is not required to provide compensation for the taking.  Rather, the sovereign
admits liability for the taking of the private property and merely seeks a determina-
tion of the just compensation required for the taking.
137 See OR. R. CIV. P. 51 C(2) (providing that a jury trial may be denied to liti-
gants if “[t]he court, upon motion of a party or on its own initiative, finds that a right
of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Constitution or
the statutes of this state”).
138 In 2003, 655,574 cases were filed in Oregon’s circuit courts, although that num-
ber declined to around 610,000 cases in 2004 and 2005. SEC’Y OF STATE, OREGON
BLUE BOOK 2007–2008, at Cases Filed in Oregon Courts:  2000-2005, http://blue
book.state.or.us/state/judicial/judicial28.htm.
139 As of January 1, 2007, 173 circuit judges were serving Oregon’s thirty-six coun-
ties. Id. at Oregon Circuit Courts, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/judicial/judicial
06.htm.
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B. Possible Solutions
Decisions about property rights, a fundamental individual lib-
erty that was addressed within the Bill of Rights, may be “too
important to be trusted to trained men.”140  The Oregon Su-
preme Court has even described property rights as “sacred.”141
Indeed, Measure 37, passed by Oregon voters by a sixty-one per-
cent majority, signifies the importance of property rights to
Oregonians.142  Therefore, broad consensus might exist in Ore-
gon to cure the ambiguity addressed in this Comment if such an
attempt were made.  However, there would likely be differences
of opinion on the mode for change.
1. Constitutional Reinterpretation
One option would be to argue for a reinterpretation of Ore-
gon’s constitutional jurisprudence on eminent domain.  If a com-
mon law jury antecedent for eminent domain proceedings could
be established,143 the Oregon Constitution would have preserved
the jury trial right in those cases.144  Not only would this require
a case to actually come before the Oregon Supreme Court, the
Court would be required to overrule numerous precedent cases,
140 Fred A. Granata, On Jury Duty:  ‘Too Important to be Trusted to Trained
Men ,’ OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2002 (quoting Gilbert Keith (G.K.) Chesterton, an
English journalist from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), available
at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/02augsep/parting.html.
141 Minto v. Salem Water, Light & Power Co., 120 Or. 202, 219-20, 250 P. 722, 728
(1926).
142 See  Or. Sec’y of State Election Div., General Election Official Results, Nov. 2,
2004, http://www.sos.state.or.us./elections/nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf.  In contrast, in
its 2006 general election, Idaho voters resoundingly rejected Proposition 2, a state-
wide initiative similar to Measure 37, Idaho Sec’y of State, General Election Results
(2006), http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ELECT/RESULTS/2006/general/tot_stwd.htm
(providing election results with twenty-four percent of voters in favor of Proposition
2 and seventy-six percent opposed), which would have amended Idaho’s statutes to
permit a condemnee to collect just compensation for a regulatory taking.  Idaho
Sec’y of State, Proposed Ballot Initiatives (2006), http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/
inits/06init08.htm.  On the same night, Washington voters rejected Initiative Mea-
sure 933, Wash. Sec’y of State, 2006 General Election Results, http://vote.wa.gov/
Elections/General/Measures.aspx (providing results of forty-one percent of voters in
favor and fifty-nine percent opposed), which would also have provided condemnees
with the right to collect compensation when land use regulations reduce the value of
private property.  Wash. Sec’y of State, Initiative 933, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/
elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
143 At common law, eminent domain actions were tried to some kind of a jury, but
this has not been interpreted to be the same kind of jury as a common law jury.  1A
NICHOLS, supra note 17, § 4.105[1]. R
144 OR. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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which would be neither effective nor feasible.  There are no cases
to indicate that Oregon appellate courts are willing to deviate
from the historical interpretation denying a constitutional right
to a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings.
2. Legislative Amendment
This Comment has argued that Oregon’s condemnation stat-
utes are ambiguous regarding whether a jury trial of compensa-
tion is guaranteed in an eminent domain proceeding.  The
Oregon legislature could decide whether a jury trial of compen-
sation should be guaranteed and amend Oregon’s condemnation
statutes accordingly.  There are several simple ways in which the
legislature could cure the current ambiguity to guarantee a jury
trial.  First, the legislature could amend the General Condemna-
tion Procedure Act to include “compensation” or “just compen-
sation” in its definitions section and specify that “compensation
shall be assessed by a jury unless waived.”  Such an inclusion
would ensure that it applies to both parts of the Act, the part
regarding corporations as condemners and the part regarding the
state as condemner.  Although perhaps less elegant, this specific
clause could also be included elsewhere throughout the Act
when addressing “compensation.”
Alternately, the legislature could clearly deny an absolute right
to a jury trial.  In the definitions section of the General Condem-
nation Procedure Act, “compensation” could be defined to in-
corporate a mode of determination other than the jury, such as a
board of commissioners.  This was the issue in Kendall v. Post ,
where the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a statute that provided
that compensation be determined by a means other than a
jury.145  Furthermore, the legislature could explicitly guarantee
the right to a jury trial to one party but not the other were it to
conclude that it only intended the aggrieved property owners to
request a jury trial of compensation and not the condemner.
Because such a course of action would not require a reinter-
pretation of the Oregon Constitution or existing statutes, amend-
ing the statutes would avoid the pitfalls that a process of
reinterpretation within the courts would invite.
145 8 Or. 141, 146 (1879), available at  1879 WL 1242, at *4 (“[I]t is competent for
the legislature to provide for assessments by any other just mode . . . without giving
him the right to be heard before a jury.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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3. Constitutional Amendment
The Oregon legislature might prefer to leave a potentially con-
tentious issue to the Oregon voters.  Oregon was the second state
to approve a statewide initiative and popular referendum, and
did so by a large margin in 1902.146  The initiative and referen-
dum enable Oregon voters to adopt laws and amend the state’s
constitution in popular elections.  As a ballot-measure state, a
concerned individual or group could propose a constitutional
amendment directly to Oregon voters that would guarantee a
jury trial of compensation in eminent domain proceedings.  Al-
ternately, the Oregon legislature could refer this constitutional
amendment to the voters.  This method, whether it be initiated
by a member of the public or by the legislature, would likely be
the most streamlined and effective way to address the issue.  Sim-
ply inserting a clause within Oregon’s takings clause stating that
“compensation shall be determined by a jury unless waived”
would likely cure the current ambiguity in the condemnation
statutes.  This clause would likely apply to Measure 37 and would
prevent the need to amend the statute to include a jury trial guar-
antee.  Furthermore, such a clause would provide the option of
waiver for situations where all the litigants prefer a bench trial.
Most importantly, this constitutional amendment would be a pre-
146 The History of Initiative and Referendum in the United States , I&R FACTSHEET
(Initiative & Referendum Inst., Leesburg, Va.), at 1, 2, available at http://www.iandr
institute.org/Quick%20Fact-Handouts.htm (follow “Number Two:  The History of
the Initiative and Referendum Process?” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).  The
initiative process enables citizens of a particular state to adopt laws and to amend
the state’s constitution. What Is Initiative and Referendum? , I&R FACTSHEET (Initi-
ative & Referendum Inst., Leesburg, Va.), at 1, 1, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
Quick%20Fact-Handouts.htm (follow “Number One:  What is the Initiative and
Referendum Process?” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).  Twenty-four states,
including Oregon, have some form of initiative. Id. Oregon has a direct initiative,
which means that laws or amendments proposed by the people are placed directly
on the ballot for the people to accept or reject, without submitting the proposal to
the legislature first. Id. at 2. Other states have an indirect initiative that requires
the proposal first be submitted to the legislature before being submitted to the peo-
ple to accept or reject. Id. The referendum process enables citizens to reject laws or
amendments proposed by the state legislature. Id. at 1. Forty-nine states, including
Oregon, have some form of referendum. Id. The popular referendum enables the
people to refer, by collecting signatures on a petition, specific legislation that was
enacted by their legislature for the people to either accept or reject. Id. The legisla-
tive referendum allows the legislature to submit legislation to the vote of the people.
Id.  Oregon employs both processes of referenda:  popular and legislative. Id. at 2.
For more on Oregon’s initiative system, see Ben Hovland, Comment, Championed
by Progressives and William U’Ren:  Can Oregon Give the Ballot Initiative to the
People Again? , 85 OR. L. REV. 275 (2006).
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emptive strike.  This option would ensure that no taxpayer dol-
lars in the form of judicial resources are expended to decide this
issue, only to incite a subsequent constitutional amendment that
is a reaction to an unpopular court decision or legislative
enactment.
CONCLUSION
An inconsistency exists between common practices in Oregon
and the right to a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings.  Ju-
ries are routinely impaneled to determine compensation in con-
demnation proceedings in Oregon, but this is not based upon any
constitutional or statutory guarantee.  Without a constitutional or
statutory guarantee, a trial judge could deny a request for a jury
trial of compensation, and be upheld on appeal.  Washington and
California, along with numerous other states, explicitly guarantee
a jury determination of compensation in their state takings
clauses.  Oregon, on the other hand, seems to be operating on an
assumption that compensation ought to be determined by a jury,
but this assumption may not be able to withstand closer scrutiny.
This Comment should not be construed as an attack on current
practice and jurisprudence in Oregon.  Rather, the purpose of
this Comment is to illuminate an opportunity for Oregon to align
its constitutional and statutory provisions with the wishes of
Oregonians.  Without some action, litigation entailing substantial
costs and consuming valuable resources will be required to clar-
ify the uncertainty in this area of the law.
The Oregon legislature is in a position to revisit the condemna-
tion statutes, discuss the actual intent of these statutes, and weigh
the costs and benefits of possible alternatives.  The legislature
should consider whether it intends to guarantee a right to a jury
determination of compensation in an eminent domain action.  If
it does, action must be taken.  If it does not, action must also be
taken.  The current ambiguity of the statutory language on this
particular issue serves neither determination.
It seems likely, however, that Oregon citizens might be highly
motivated to act.  Property owners litigating Measure 37 or other
condemnation cases against the State of Oregon would likely be
disillusioned to learn that they possess no right to have a jury
decide how much their properties are worth.  As this Comment
illustrates, there are arguments that property owners could ad-
vance that have a shot at winning, even absent the clarifications
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to eminent domain proceedings suggested by this Comment.
However, with an amended takings clause, property owners
would have a slam dunk.
